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ABSTRACT. Using a large unbalanced panel data set of
Portuguese manufacturing firms surviving over the period from
1990 to 2001, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether
liquidity constraints faced by business firms affect firm growth.
We use a GMM-system to estimate a dynamic panel data model
of firm growth that incorporates cash flow as a measure of
liquidity constraints and persistence of growth. The model is
estimated for all size classes, including micro firms. Our findings
reveal that smaller and younger firms have higher growth-cash
flow sensitivities than larger and more mature firms. This is
consistent with the suggestion that financial constraints on firm
growth may be relatively more severe for small and young
firms. Nevertheless, the same finding can be interpreted in a
different way if we consider the more recent literature which
interpret the higher investment/cash flow sensitivity of younger
and smaller firm in absence of financial market imperfection as
the outcome of these firms reaction to the fact that realisation
of their cash flows reveals them the direction to go in presence
of uncertainty of their growth prospect. Besides, firms that were
small and young at the beginning of the sample period exhibited
more persistent growth than those that were large and old.
Finally, these results have significant policy implications.
KEY WORDS: firm growth, firm size, GMM estimator,
liquidity constraints, panel data.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C23, G32, L11.
1. Introduction
The availability and cost of finance is one of the
factors which affect the ability of a business to
grow (Binks and Ennew, 1996a: 17). The growth
of firms, especially small and young firms, is
constrained by the quantity of internally gener-
ated finance available. Butters and Lintner (1945:
3) provide some of the earliest research to support
this theory. They conclude that ‘‘(m)any small
companies – even companies with promising
growth opportunities – find it extremely difficult
or impossible to raise outside capital on reason-
ably favourable terms’’ and that most small firms
finance their growth almost exclusively through
retained earnings. Recent empirical evidence
indicates that, due to asymmetric information
and different collateral value between firms of
different size, the wedge between the cost of
internal and external finance may be large for
small firms.1 In relation to this, the financing
constraints theory also complements recent re-
search that emphasizes how access to finance af-
fects firm formation, survival and growth.2
In effect this research combines two strands of
economics literature, that of the investment lit-
erature and that of the firm growth literature.
With respect to investment literature, it is to en-
hance the original work of Fazzari et al. (1988)
that study the relationship between financing
constraints and the investment/cash flow sensi-
tivity. Based on Fazzari et al. (1988), Carpenter
and Petersen (2002) focus on the relationship
between financing constraints and firm growth.
Subsequently, built on Carpenter and Petersen
(2002) and take into account the critiques to
Fazzari et al. (1988) the present study employs
the financing constraint literature to explain the
dynamics of the growth of the firms. We apply
dynamic panel data techniques to an extended
firm growth specification that also includes per-
sistence of chance and liquidity constraints
proxied by cash flow. This study makes signifi-
cant contributions to the literature on the
dynamics of firm growth. First, we investigate the
effects of internal finance on firm growth in the
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context of surviving Portuguese manufacturing
firms. The goal is to assess whether stylized facts
of firm growth might be better explained by
taking into account the link between financial
constraints and firm growth. This differs from the
large body of literature that has focused on tra-
ditional firm growth analysis, attempting to ex-
plain the relationship between firm size, age and
growth. Second, our dynamic model of firm
growth with liquidity constraints also addresses
the effect of persistence of chance or serial cor-
relation on firm growth. Third, we consider an
unbalanced panel data set that covers all size
classes, including the very smallest firms. Fourth,
because we may expect that different size cate-
gories may face differences when attempting to
access external finance we split our sample by
firm size and firm age. Finally, we apply the dy-
namic panel data techniques developed by
Blundell and Bond (1998), which is known as the
GMM-system estimator. The GMM methods
control for biases due to unobserved firm-specific
effects and lagged endogenous variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents an overview of the literature on firm
growth and financial constraints, whilst Section
3 reports a dynamic firm growth model subject
to liquidity constraints and testable hypotheses.
Section 4 describes the sample used and presents
some descriptive statistics, and Section 5 reports
the regression results and examines the robust-
ness of our findings. Finally, Section 6 summa-
rizes our findings and their policy implications.
2. Dynamics of firm growth and liquidity
constraints
Recent studies of the relationship between firm
size and growth with more detailed data sets
have overturned the conclusion of Gibrat’s law
(Gibrat, 1931), also known as Law of Propor-
tionate Effect (LPE), which holds that firm size
and growth are independent.3 Studies by Evans
(1987a, 1987b), Hall (1987), and Dunne and
Hughes (1994) show that the growth rate of
manufacturing firms and the volatility of growth
is negatively associated with firm size and age.
Based on this and other empirical evidence,
Geroski (1995) infers a stylized result where
both firm size and age are correlated with the
survival and growth of the firms. Firm size and
age also play an important role in characterizing
the dynamics of job reallocation. Davis et al.
(1996) show that the rates of job creation and
job destruction in US manufacturing firms are
decreasing in firm age and size and that,
depending on the initial size, small firms grow
faster than large firms. These findings were
interpreted in the context of theoretical ap-
proaches that highlight the role of learning in
explaining the dynamics of firm size and indus-
try structure (Jovanovic, 1982).
To study the dynamics of firm growth and to
explain the possible deviations from Gibrat’s law
wemake use of the financing constraint literature.
Despite a growing body of literature investigating
the role of financial constraints on firm perfor-
mance, empirical studies on the effect of financing
constraints over firm growth are scarce (Carpen-
ter and Petersen, 2002; Cooley and Quadrini,
2001; Kumar et al., 1999 – for the US; Elston,
2002 – forGermany; Cabral andMata, 2003 – for
Portugal; Desai et al., 2003; Wagenvoort, 2003 –
for Europe; Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2004 – for Italy;
Hutchinson and Xavier, 2004 – for Slovenia and
Belgium). These studies follow Fazzari et al.
(1988) who investigated the effect of cash flow on
investment. They have tried to show that financial
constraints are a significant determinant of firms’
investment decisions. This means that the
investment rate of a firmdepends on the cash flow
that is available to it.4 In particular, this seems
true for young firms (Cressy, 1996; Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989; Xu, 1998). According to these
studies, capital constraints have been offered as
an explanation for the pattern in the size distri-
bution of firms and the relation between size and
growth.
With respect to the distribution of firm size,
Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Cabral and Mata
(2003), and Desai et al. (2003) argue that when
there are capital constraints the firm size distri-
bution will be skewed. To examine the violations
of Gibrat’s law, Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
develop a model of financial frictions and
investment. They show that capital constraints
can potentially explain why small firms pay
lower dividends, are more highly levered, have
higher Tobin’s q, invest more, and have invest-
ments that are more sensitive to cash flows.
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Cabral and Mata (2003) develop a model of firm
growth that depends on investments and access
to capital. Their model predicts that in the
presence of capital constraints, the firm size
distribution will be skewed. As capital con-
straints worsen, firm size distributions will be-
come more skewed. The intuition behind their
result is that small firms with good investment
opportunities may be periodically unable to
raise the resources to exploit those opportuni-
ties. In that case, they will underinvest and grow
more slowly than larger firms with an internal
cash flow to fund their projects. They argue that
the distribution of firm size will be more highly
skewed for younger firms because they are more
likely to be capital rationed. Thus, to explore the
relevance of financing constraints for the evo-
lution of the firm size distribution, Cabral and
Mata (2003) use a large sample of Portuguese
manufacturing firms. They find that the distri-
bution of firm size is indeed skewed and that the
skewness is greater for younger firms. In addi-
tion, they also find that some of these small
firms are small because they want to be small,
whilst others are small because they are finan-
cially constrained. In the future, when financing
constraints cease to be binding the latter will
grow to their optimal size and the distribution of
firm size becomes more symmetric. Considering
the roles of institutional environment and the
capital constraints on entrepreneurial activity
across Europe, Desai et al. (2003) also examine
the skewness of the firm size distribution.
Comparing the overall distribution of firm size
between Western Europe and Central and
Eastern Europe they conclude that both firm
size distributions are skewed. However, the
distribution is more highly skewed for Central
and Eastern Europe. When they break down the
distribution by firm age they find that the dis-
tribution of firms 10 years old or less are the
most highly skewed and that firms older than
10 years have size distributions that are very
close to a lognormal distribution. Thus, they
conclude that the skewness of firm size decrease
with firm age. Finally, they perform a similar
analysis for Great Britain on its own, and they
find that the overall distribution is much less
skewed and the differences in skewness by co-
hort are much less pronounced. This could mean
that this country has a highly developed capital
market.
A different approach suggests that financing
constraints may also explain the relation be-
tween firm size and growth. In this case it is to
enhance the contributions of Carpenter and
Petersen (2002), Elston (2002), Wagenvoort
(2003), Fagiolo and Luzzi (2004) and Hutchin-
son and Xavier (2004). Carpenter and Petersen
(2002) show that the internal finance theory of
growth can help to account for stylized facts of
firm growth. These authors follow the approach
of Fazzari et al. (1988), but instead of examining
how possible finance constraints could affect
investment they investigate how possible finance
constraints could affect the growth of total as-
sets. Thus, to estimate the sensitivity of a firm’s
growth rate to its cash flow, they develop a
model of firm growth with financing constraints
that includes as explanatory variables internal
finance, measured by the ratio between cash flow
over gross total assets, and Tobin’s q. The test on
the relevance of finance constraints uses the same
principle as that applied to investment models:
higher growth-cash flow sensitivities are a sign of
bigger financing problems. Considering an
unbalanced panel data set of small quoted firms
in the United States they find that a firm facing
binding cash flow constraints exhibits approxi-
mately a one to one relationship between the
growth of its assets and internal finance. Fur-
thermore, firms that have access to external fi-
nance exhibit a much weaker relationship. In
particular, they found that the growth-cash flow
sensitivity of firms that use external equity is
lower than the growth-cash flow sensitivity of
firms that make little use of external equity.
Therefore, they conclude that financing con-
straints are binding for the latter companies.
Carpenter and Petersen’s model was developed
particularly for quoted firms and excludes the
smallest firms. Besides, it is important to note
that small firms in the US context are different
from Europe. Applying this model to European
firms raises some issues regarding the industrial
structure that is present in Europe where small
and medium enterprises form a significant por-
tion of the industrial make-up. Notwithstanding
these limitations, Wagenvoort (2003) estimated
Carpenter and Petersen’s (2002) model across
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EU countries for different size classes of firms.
He also concludes that higher growth-cash flow
sensitivities are a sign of bigger finance problems
and that growth-cash flow sensitivity of SMEs
are broadly similar across EU countries. Their
empirical work supports survey results suggest-
ing that finance constraints tend to hinder the
growth of small and very small firms; on average,
the growth of these firms is one-to-one related to
internal funds, notably retained profits. They
also find that growth-cash flow sensitivities are
higher for unquoted firms than for quoted firms.
Based on Hall (1987) and Evans (1987a,
1987b) firm growth specifications, Elston (2002)
developed an alternative model which controls
other factors related to growth including
liquidity constraints measured by cash flow.5
Elston (2002) finds that cash flow, after con-
trolling for size and age, positively affects growth
of German Neuer-Markt firms. On the other
hand, Audretsch and Elston (2002) show that
medium-sized German firms are more liquidity
constrained (in their investment behaviour) than
either the smallest or the largest ones. Contrary
to Carpenter and Petersen’s (2002) model, this
specification is better suited to being applied to a
sample of unquoted firms because we cannot use
the Tobin’s q that captures the investment
opportunities. Following Elston (2002), Fagiolo
and Luzzi (2004) also analyse whether liquidity
constraints faced by business firms affect the
dynamics of firm size and growth. Considering a
balanced panel data set of manufacturing Italian
firms over the period 1995–2000 they estimated
firm growth specifications by pooled OLS, suit-
ably expanded to take liquidity constraints into
account. Finally, Hutchinson and Xavier (2004)
make a quantitative exploration to investigate
how the quantity of internal finance constrains
the growth of SMEs across the entire manufac-
turing sector of a leading transition country,
Slovenia, and an established market economy,
Belgium. They find that firms in Slovenia are
more sensitive to internal finance constraints
than their Belgian counterparts. This suggests
that Slovenian firms are no longer recipients of
soft budget constraints, capital markets are not
yet functioning properly.
Based on Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and
applying dynamic panel data techniques, this
study examines if financing constraints may also
explain the relation between firm size and
growth. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) work is
built on Fazzari et al. (1988). Fazzari et al.
(1988) suggest that firms facing financing con-
straints should exhibit high investment-cash
flow sensitivities, reflecting the wedge between
the costs of external and internal funds. How-
ever, the robustness of the implications pro-
posed by Fazzari et al. (1988) has been
challenged on theoretical grounds and subject to
some critiques. According to the recent debate
in the literature, a new interpretation of the
investment/cash flow sensitivity emerged. This
new interpretation of this sensitivity may be
decomposed into two groups of papers.
The first group (Almeida et al., 2004; Cleary,
1999; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) argues exactly
the contrary of what Fazzari et al. (1988) state,
i.e. least constrained firms are those whose
investment is more sensitivity to cash flow.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) demonstrate theo-
retically that firm investment choice under profit
maximising behaviour does not imply a mono-
tonic relationship between financing constraints
and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.
Empirical findings which are similar to those of
Kaplan and Zingales are found by Cleary (1999)
who uses multiple discriminant analysis to
identify firm financing constraints and finds that
least constrained firms are those whose invest-
ment is more sensitive to cash flow. An original
theoretical interpretation of these findings
comes from Almeida et al. (2004) who analyze
the demand of precautionary savings of con-
strained and unconstrained firms and find that
financially constrained firms have a higher sen-
sitivity of cash (reserves) to cash flow which
justifies the observed reduced sensitivity of their
investment to cash flow.
The second group (Abel and Eberly, 2003,
2004; Alti, 2003; Gomes, 2001) interprets the
higher investment/cash flow sensitivity of younger
and smaller firm in the absence of financial
market imperfection as the outcome of these
firm reaction to the fact that realization of their
cash flows reveal them the direction to go in
presence of uncertainty of their growth prospect.
Alti (2003) shows that FHP findings may simply
result from a standard neoclassical model in
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which younger firms face uncertainty about their
growth prospects and this uncertainty is re-
solved through time by cash flow realizations
which, in part, represent the option value of
their long-term growth potential. Calibration of
Alti (2003) model shows that investment is sen-
sitive to cash flow for all firms after correcting
for Tobin’s q. In this model, investment/cash
flow sensitivity is higher for younger and smaller
firms with high growth rates since these firms
learn about their project quality through cash
flow realizations. In a similar way, Gomes
(2001) and Abel and Eberly (2003, 2004) develop
frameworks in which positive investment/cash
flow correlations arise in the absence of financial
market imperfections. These two strands of the
financing constraints literature have serious
consequences on the interpretation of our find-
ings and on the way to interpret the hypotheses
to be tested.
3. Model and testable hypotheses
The univariate model of firm growth is based on
a model in which logarithmic firm size and
logarithmic growth (the first difference of log
size) are the only variables. In this case, it is
assumed that:
growthit ¼ ai þ dt þ b 1ð Þsizeit1 þ lit;
lit ¼ qlit1 þ eit:
ð1Þ
Equation (1) is a first order autoregressive
model for sizeit, the natural logarithm of the size
of firm i at time t. The values of the parameters
in (1) determine the behaviour of log size over
time. In particular, b describes the relationship
between size and annual growth, and ai and dt
allow for individual and time effects, respec-
tively. The unobserved time-invariant firm spe-
cific effects, ai, allows for heterogeneity across
firms. q captures persistence of chance or serial
correlation in lit, the disturbance term of the
growth equation. Finally, eit, is a random dis-
turbance, assumed to be normal, independent
and identically distributed (IID) with E(eit) = 0
and var eitð Þ ¼ r2e >0. Tschoegl (1983) identifies
three testable propositions which derive from
the LPE: first, growth rates are independent of
firm size; second, above or below average
growth for any individual firm does not tend to
persist from one period to the next; and third,
the variability of growth is independent of firm
size.
The analysis of the relationship between
growth and size consists of testing the null
hypothesis (H0:b – 1=0) embodied in Gibrat’s
law which states that the probability distribu-
tion of growth rates is the same for all classes
of firm. If b ‡ 1 in (1), ai = 0 for all i.6 b > 1
implies company growth trajectories that are
explosive: firms tend to grow faster as they get
larger. Such a pattern is conceivable for a
limited time, but presumably could not con-
tinue indefinitely. The variance of the cross-
sectional firm size distribution and the level of
concentration both increase over time. b = 1
implies non-explosive growth, which is unre-
lated to firm size. In this situation the LPE
holds, which means that the mean and vari-
ance of growth is independent of size. Again,
the variance of the firm size distribution and
the level of concentration increase over time.
If b < 1 firm sizes are mean-reverting.7 In this
case the interpretation of ai is different:
ai/(1 ) b) is the average log size to which firm
i tends to revert in the long term. It is there-
fore necessary to assume ai > 0. Cross-sec-
tionally, ai can be considered as being IID
with E(ai) = 0 and var aið Þ ¼ r2a  0. If r2a ¼ 0
the individual effects are homogeneous (all
firms tend to revert towards the same mean
size) and if r2a  0 they are heterogeneous (the
mean sizes are firm-specific). Thus, departures
from Gibrat’s law arise: if b „ 1, firm sizes
regress towards or away from the mean size; if
q > 0 then above-average growth in one
period tends to persist into the next, or if q <
0 then a period of above average growth tends
to be followed by one of below average
growth; or if r2e ¼ r2e i; tð Þ then growth rates
are heteroskedastic.
The results of LPE tests have been mixed,
with several early studies either finding no rela-
tionship or a positive relationship between size
and growth. Earlier studies found that Gibrat’s
law holds, at least as a first approximation, but
most of them are based on samples of the largest
firms in the economy, or quoted firms. Others,
including more recent studies, identify an inverse
143Firm Growth and Liquidity Constraints
relationship and therefore reject the LPE
(Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Evans, 1987a, 1987b;
Goddard et al., 2002a, 2002b; Hall, 1987; Hart
and Oulton, 1996).
Following Goddard, Wilson and Blandon
(2002), and for the purposes of panel estimation,
(1) can be re-written as follows:
growthit ¼ai 1 qð Þ þ dt
þ b 1ð Þsizeit1 þ qgrowthit1 þ git
ð2Þ
where git = eit + q(1–b)sizeit–2, so git = eit
under H0: b = 1.
One remarkable fact about the model (2) is its
lack of economics. Recent contributions to the
explanation of firm growth include the role of
financing constraints. Thus, to study the effect
of financing constraints on the growth of the
firms we consider the multivariate model that is
based on expanded version of (2), and that
incorporates additional independent variables
on the right hand side:
growthit ¼ai 1 qð Þ þ dt þ b 1ð Þsizeit1
þ qgrowthit1 þ vageit1 þ ucfit1
þ git
ð3Þ
where ageit–1, is the natural logarithmic of firm
age, whilst cfit–1 is the natural logarithmic of
cash flow to the beginning of the period calcu-
lated as net firm revenues plus total deprecia-
tion. The variable cash flow captures the
sensitivity of growth-cash flow. The greater the
magnitude of this coefficient the stronger the
relationship between cash flow and growth. On
the other hand, a smaller magnitude implies a
weaker relationship and we interpret this to
mean that a firm has better access to external
finance. It is also possible that cash flow is
endogenous as it is a credible proposition that
higher growth rates lead to bigger changes in
cash flow. So, in Equation (3) we test the null
hypotheses of H0: v = 0 and H0: u = 0, with
the alternative that they are different from zero.
If we do not reject these null hypotheses this
means that firm age, and liquidity constraints
have no influence on the growth of the firms.
Equations (2) and (3) permit direct tests of the
first two of Tschoegl’s (1983) three testable
propositions: that growth rates are independent
of firm size (b – 1 = 0), and that growth does
not persist (q = 0). The third proposition that
the variability of growth is independent of size
can be investigated by applying a standard het-
eroskedasticity test to the residuals of each
estimated equation.
A negative age growth relation, as predicted
by Jovanovic’s (1982) model, has been revealed
in a number of empirical studies and different
country contexts (Evans, 1987b; Dunne et al,
1989 – for US; Dunne and Hughes, 1994 – for
UK; Hamshad, 1994 – for France; Farinas and
Moreno, 2000 – for Spain; Becchetti and Tro-
vato, 2002 – for Italy; and Nurmi, 2003 – for
Finland). By sorting the firms into intervals re-
lated to their age, Evans (1987a, 1987b) showed
that firm age is an important factor in explaining
firm growth. Firm growth seems to slow with
age. Similar results were given by Dunne and
Hughes (1994). They conclude that young firms
grew more rapidly when analysing a specific size
class of firms. Exceptions are provided by Das
(1995) who studied firm growth in the computer
hardware industry in India, and Elston (2002).
Both studies found a positive effect of firm age
on firm growth. In Heshmati (2001) the negative
relationship between age and growth of Swedish
firms holds for growth measured in employment
terms, while it is positive in asset and sales firm
growth models.
Finally and with respect to the liquidity con-
straints, the purpose of including a measure of
firm liquidity in the regression is two-fold. First,
by adding this measure we are able to examine
the degree to which a firm’s growth is impacted
by liquidity constraints. A second interpretation
is that by keeping liquidity constraints constant,
we can focus on the relationship of interest –
that of firm size to growth, controlling for the
liquidity constraints of the firm. We are then
able to separate out the size effects into two
pieces, those which stem from ‘‘financial’’ effects
and those from ‘‘other’’ size effects. Further-
more, we may also take into consideration the
alternative interpretation of the investment/cash
flow sensitivity, namely the second group of
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papers that gives a different interpretation which
may be consistent with our findings of a stronger
link between cash flow and growth for smaller
and younger firms. This will allow us to distin-
guish then whether firm size may promote
growth simply because larger firms have better
access to capital or larger cash flow or whether
other size effects related to firm life-cycle,
economies of scale and scope, or perhaps other
related factors, are of importance.
Firm cash flows are used as a proxy for
liquidity constraints of the firm in much the
same way that they are introduced on the right-
hand-side of the empirical investment models in
the literature.8 The rationale for these models
being that once we move away from the perfect
capital markets world, we find that a firm can-
not always separate financial and real decisions.
Liquidity problems, often exacerbated by
asymmetry of information between suppliers of
finance and firms for example, will influence real
firm decisions such as investment in capital or
labour – and by definition then, firm growth as
measured by such. We expect these problems to
be particularly severe for smaller and younger
firms with limited access to capital and capital
markets and little in the way of physical capital
with which to secure debt. In this model, then,
we would predict that both the cash flow and
size effects will be particularly pronounced for
the smaller firms. Problems like liquidity con-
straints were found to confront smaller enter-
prises by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and
Fazzari et al. (1988). Harhoff (1998) also argues
that small firms are more likely to be charac-
terised by excess sensitivity to the availability of
internal finance.9 First, smaller firms will be
characterized by idiosyncratic risk which would
raise the cost of external capital. In addition, a
randomly chosen group of small firms will in-
clude a relatively large number of young firms,
hence outside investors may not yet have suffi-
cient information to distinguish good from bad
performers. Second, these firms may also have
more limited access to external financial mar-
kets. Finally, these firms have less collateral in
terms of existing assets which could be used for
obtaining external loans. But Devereux and
Schiantarelli (1990), and Bond et al. (2003) have
found stronger evidence of financial effects on
investment among larger firms. Bond et al.
(2003) conclude that the availability of internal
finance appears to have been a more important
constraint on company investment in the sample
of UK firms than in samples from other conti-
nental European countries (France, Belgium
and Germany) over the period 1978–1989. This
finding is consistent with the suggestion that the
market-oriented financial system in the UK
performs less well in channelling investment
funds to firms with profitable investment
opportunities than do the continental European
financial systems.
To estimate these dynamic regression models
using panels containing many firms and a small
number of time periods, we have used a system
GMM estimator developed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
This estimator controls for the presence of
unobserved firm-specific effects and for the
endogeneity of firm size and cash flow variables.
The instruments used depend on the assumption
made as to whether the variables are endoge-
nous or predetermined or exogenous. Essentially
we used lags of all the firm level variables in the
model. The precise instruments that we used are
reported in the tables. Instrument validity was
tested using a Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. The system GMM estimators re-
ported here generally produced more reasonable
estimates of the autoregressive dynamics than
the basic first-differenced estimators.10 This is
consistent with the analysis of Blundell and
Bond (1998), who show that in autoregressive
models with persistent series, the first-differ-
enced estimator can be subject to serious finite
sample biases as a result of weak instruments,
and that these biases can be greatly reduced by
including the levels equations in the system
estimator. Lastly, it is assumed that size and
cash flow are endogenous variables, whilst age is
pre-determined.
4. Data and summary statistics
The data set used in this work was collected by
the Bank of Portugal, which surveys a random
sample of firms on an annual basis. This data-
base has one feature that makes it a very good
source for the study of market dynamics.
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Contrary to the database used by Cabral and
Mata (2003), which came from the Portuguese
Ministry of Employment (Quadros de Pessoal)
and was primarily designed to collect data on
the labour market, the Central de Balanc¸os of
the Bank of Portugal provides mostly financial
data based on the accounts of firms. The firms
are classified according to the sector of their
main activity (NACE-Rev. 2).
For the purpose of this paper, cleaning pro-
cedures have been followed. First, we removed
from the original sample firms whose industrial
activity was unknown. Second, we excluded
observations with either missing or non-positive
values for the variables used (number of
employees, age, and cash flow). Third, for the
empirical part of this paper the data is limited to
surviving firms. Finally, given the requirements
of the econometric methodology adopted we
selected only firms with at least four consecutive
periods.
The final sample is an unbalanced panel that
includes 7653 surviving manufacturing firms
operating in Portugal, with a total of 44,938
observations, covering the period from 1990 to
2001. This data set includes individual firm level
data with all size classes, including micro firms.
Due to the higher probability of slowly-growing
small plants exiting, sample selection issues may
be a problem when the data sample consists only
of surviving firms. Thus, due to the short growth
interval used, it is believed that the sample
selection bias is not likely to be very large for the
data set used. Furthermore, most of the earlier
studies (Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Evans,
1987a, 1987b; Hall, 1987; Heshmati, 2001;
Mata, 1994; Nurmi, 2003) have concluded that
the negative relationship between firm size and
growth is not due to sample selection bias alone.
So it may be more beneficial to concentrate so-
lely on the dynamic panel data model’s context
and leave the selection issue aside.
With regard to the variables used, the
dependent variable, GROWTH, is measured by
the employment growth rate in two consecutive
years. This variable has been commonly used in
the literature on the growth of the firms. The
choice of explanatory variables is theoretically
driven and aims to proxy firm-specific charac-
teristics that are likely to determine the growth
of the firms. Thus, we measure firm size (SIZE)
by the number of employees, and firm age
(AGE) by the number of years a firm is oper-
ating in an industry. We construct a measure of
cash flow (CF) by adding depreciation to profits
net of interest and taxes.11 All variables have
been subjected to logarithmic transformation
(natural log) and are expressed with small caps.
Before we start the empirical analysis in the
next Section, we explore some of the summary
statistics and present some basic features of the
sample. In Table I, we report the summary sta-
tistics of the variables used in the econometric
analysis for whole sample. Data on employment
demonstrate that the size distribution is highly
skewed. Mean value of employees is substan-
tially larger than median values (3 times). This is
not surprising given that we expect a skewed
distribution of firm size. This result is consistent
with the idea that in the presence of capital
constraints, the firm size distribution will be
skewed. The average number of employees is
about 57, whereas the median and 90th per-
centile , measures that are less susceptible to
outliers, are 19 and 124 employees, respectively.
This result confirms the presence of a large
number of small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs). SMEs represent an important source of
job creation. One reason put forward for the
SME sector being smaller in the European
TABLE I
Summary of sample statistics
Variables Percentile Mean Std. dev Min Max
50th 75th 90th
Growth 0 0.069 0.2076 0.0051 0.2396 )3.93 3.97
size 19 49 124 57 166.19 1 7808
Age 14 23 36 18 16.16 1 243
cf 44,922 182,650 677,767 513438.7 4,633,929 5 2.91e+08
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Union is that firms that are unable to raise
external finance are forced to rely solely on
internal finance thus constraining their growth.
This problem would be further exacerbated if
financial systems are not functioning properly.
As Konings et al. (2003) and Budina et al. (2000)
show this appears to be the case of the European
Union. Relative to firm growth rates, the mean
value is 0.51%. On average the firm is 18 years
old, whereas the median is 14 years old. These
results confirm the idea that most of the firms in
our sample are small but with some maturity.
On average cash flow is 513438.7, whereas the
median is 44,922. Finally, we also find that
smaller and younger firms need to generate
proportionally more cash flow to allow them to
grow more to reach the minimum efficient scale
that will enable survive and remain in the market.
5. Results
This section presents and interprets the estima-
tion results for dynamic firm growth equations
with serial correlation and financing constraints,
estimated by pooled OLS and GMM-sys12 in
each of our samples and over the period 1990–
2001. With regard to GMM-sys, we report re-
sults for a two-step, with standard errors that
are asymptotically robust to general heteroske-
dasticity.
We begin our empirical investigation by
reporting in Table A.I pooled OLS results for the
whole sample. The results show that: smaller and
younger firms grow more and experience more
volatile growth patterns after controlling for
liquidity constraints; and, that growth-cash flow
sensitivity is positive and statistically significant.
Nevertheless, pooled OLS results are unbiased
and inconsistent. OLS levels do not control for
the possibility bias of unobserved heterogeneity,
and lagged endogenous variables. ThereforeOLS
levels result in upward-biased estimates of the
autoregressive coefficients if firm-specific effects
are important. For these reasons, we focus our
discussion on the GMM-sys results.
Table II presents the GMM-sys results for the
whole sample. Column 1 gives Gibrat’s original
specification estimating the impact of initial firm
size and past growth on current firm growth.
The estimated coefficient of size is negative
()0.0606) indicating that smaller firms are
growing faster than larger ones during the per-
iod. However, this coefficient is non-significant.
With respect to serial correlation in propor-
tionate growth rates (coefficient of growthit)1),
factors which make a company grow abnor-
mally quickly or slowly can be ascribed to per-
sistence of chance. The estimated coefficient for
serial correlation is negative ()0.1113) and sig-
nificant at 1% significance level. This means that
growth encourages (or discourages) growth.
Firms that grew faster in the past will grow
faster in the present. According to the Wald
joint test (wJS), which tests the joint significance
of the estimated coefficients, we reject at 1%
significance level the null hypothesis that coef-
ficients of size and past growth are equal to zero.
Thus, we may reject Gibrat’s Law for this whole
sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms.
Based on Evans (1987a, 1987b) specification,
in column 2 we introduce firm age as a firm-
specific characteristic of firm growth. As ex-
pected the coefficient of firm age is negative
()0.0505) and significant at 1% level. Thus,
younger firms grow faster than mature firms.
However, the coefficient of firm size becomes
positive and significant (1% significance level).
Again, wJS reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of size, past growth and age are
different from zero.
In columns 3 and 4, through an extended
specification for growth, this study provides
evidence that liquidity constraints impact firm
size and growth, even when controlling for firm
size and age. Of particular interest is the larger
and statistically significant coefficient of cash
flow at 1% level. However, in column 3, when we
did not include the firm age variable, the esti-
mated coefficient of cash flow is 0.0354 higher
than the 0.0313 in column (4), where age is now
considered. Furthermore, when cash flow is
introduced as a regressor lagged size turns from
significantly positive (column 2) to significantly
negative (columns 3 and 4). This happens be-
cause there is a high correlation between firm size
and age which annul the explanatory power of
firm size. When cash flow is introduced as
explanatory variable the explicative power of
firm size is replaced again. Thus, we may con-
clude that the results from column 4 are more
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credible because cash flow variable annuls spu-
rious correlation between size and age.
Finally, Arellano and Bond (1991) consider
specification tests that are applicable after esti-
mating a dynamic model from panel data by the
GMMestimators. Thus, we test the validity of the
instruments used by reporting both a Sargan test
of the over-identifying restrictions, and direct
tests of serial correlation in the residuals.13 In this
context the key identifying assumption that there
is no serial correlation in the eit disturbances can
be tested by testing for no second-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The
consistency of the GMM estimator depends on
the absence of second-order serial correlation in
the residuals of the growth specifications. Them1
statistics, on the same line as m2, tests for lack of
first-order serial correlation in the differenced
residuals. Another test of specification is a Sargan
test of over-identifying restrictions, which has an
asymptotic v2-distribution under the null
hypothesis that these moment conditions are va-
lid. Thus, the validity of the dynamic models de-
pends on a lack of first- (second-) order serial
correlation (see the m1 and m2 statistics) and the
validity of the instrument set measured by the
Sargan test. The Sargan test is always accepted,
with the exception of columns 2 and 3. This
confirms the validity of the instruments chosen in
columns 1 and 4. The instruments used are de-
scribed at the bottom of each table. The two tests
of the validity of the estimator indicate both the
absence of serial correlation (m1 is significantly
negative, while m2 is not significant). Conse-
quently, we conclude that the results for this
sample are always consistent.
TABLE II
GMM-sys results for whole sample






















































































Notes: All estimates include a full set of time dummies as regressors and instruments. The null hypothesis that each coefficient
is equal to zero is tested using robust standard errors. Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-
series heteroskedasticity are reported in parenthesis. wJS is the Wald statistic of joint significance of the independent variables
(excluding time dummies and the constant term). Sargan is a test of the validity of the overidentyfing restrictions based on the
efficient two-step GMM estimator. m1 (m2) is a test of the null hypothesis of no first- (second-) order serial correlation. P-
values in square brackets and degrees of freedom in round brackets. The underlying sample consists of 7653 firms and a total
of 34,482 observations.
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The relationship between cash flow and firm
growth differs widely between firm size and firm
age. Tables III and IV report GMM-sys results
when we split the sample by exogenous criteria
of size. Pooled OLS results when we split the
sample by size are in appendix Tables A.II and
A.III. Using the European Union tradition,
firms with fewer than 50 employees were con-
sidered micro and small firms and the others are
medium and large firms. When the significance
of the difference of the cash flow variable for
smaller and larger firms is tested we conclude
that there is difference of behaviours between
these firms that is cash flow is different for
smaller and larger firms. This means that the
estimated coefficient for a product between a
variable dummy (equal to one if the firm is small
and equal to zero otherwise) and lagged cash
flow is statistically significant (at 10% level)
different from zero.
The sensitivity of firm growth to cash flow
appears to be much greater in the sample of
smaller firms with less than 50 employees than
for medium and large firms with 50 employees
or more. Analysing the results by firm size we
find much weaker effects from cash flow for
medium and large firms. This result is consistent
with the idea that small firms which face more
financing constraints and are more sensitive to
the availability of internal finance grow more
than the larger14 ones. This interpretation may
be different if Alti (2003) result’ holds. However,
to discriminate between Fazzari et al. (1988) and
Alti (2003) hypothesis is quite difficult in ab-
sence of qualitative data on financing con-
straints (Bagella et al., 2001).15
Smaller firms are limited in the extent of their
internal earnings. The weaker effects from cash
flow for medium and large Portuguese manu-
facturing firms may be explained by institutional
characteristics. There is one institutional feature
of the Portuguese financial system that is in
sharp contrast to that practised in the US and
UK, both of which may impact the extent to
which liquidity constraints occur. The institu-
tional difference that may directly impact the
TABLE III
GMM-sys results for micro and small firms (<50 employees)



















































































Notes: as in Table II. The underlying sample consists of 5874 firms and a total of 25,970 observations.
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relationship between firm size and growth in-
volves the system of firm finance. Portugal can
be classified in the ‘‘bank-oriented financial
system’’ along with the French-origin OECD
countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and
Spain). Given the specific characteristics of the
Portuguese financial system, based on an
undeveloped stock market, compared with not
only the US, but to some extent, other large
European countries as well, and in keeping with
an industrial structure which includes a rela-
tively large number of small and medium sized
firms, we may expect small and large firms to
have a complex dependence on internal funds.
This complexity is reinforced by a concentrated
ownership (lack of ownership dispersion) and
control (lack of separation between ownership
and control) even of large firms, giving its family
owners an active interest in the day-to-day
operations of the typical firm. Like other Con-
tinental European countries, the Portuguese
stock market is not an important source of fi-
nance and ownership is concentrated among
quoted and not-quoted firms.
In relation to Sargan and second-order serial
correlation tests we find that the Sargan test is
always accepted, with the exception of columns
2 and 3 in Table III. This confirms the validity
of the instrument matrix used. Furthermore, the
consistency of the results is confirmed by the
acceptance of m2 statistics.
Finally, Tables V and VI report the GMM-
sys results when we split the sample by firm age.
In particular, Table V reports the results for
young firms aged 10 years or less, whilst Ta-
ble VI shows the same results for old firms aged
over 10. Pooled OLS results for young and old
firms are given in appendices Tables A.IV and
A.V respectively. When the significance of the
difference of the cash flow variable for young
and old firms is tested we conclude that there is
difference of behaviours between these firms that
is cash flow is different for young and old firms.
This means that the estimated coefficient for a
product between a variable dummy (equal to
one if the firm is old and equal to zero other-
wise) and lagged cash flow is statistically sig-
nificant (at 10% level) different from zero.
As before, analysing Table V we find that the
cash flow coefficient is again positive and sta-
tistically significant at 1% level, 0.0449 and
0.0422 in columns 3 and 4, respectively. But this
TABLE IV
GMM-sys results for medium and large firms (‡50 employees)











































































Notes: as in Table II. The underlying sample consists of 1779 firms and a total of 8512 observations.
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TABLE V
GMM-sys results for young firms (£10 years old)















































































Notes: as in Table II. The underlying sample consists of 3795 firms and a total of 16,525 observations.
TABLE VI
GMM-sys results for old firms (>10 years old)















































































Notes: as in Table II. The underlying sample consists of 3858 firms and a total of 17,957 observations.
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estimated coefficient is higher for the sample of
young firms than for the whole sample. By
comparing these results with those reported in
Table VI for mature firms, we conclude that the
estimated coefficient for cash flow is lower for
older firms. In brief, the variable cash flow ap-
pears to play a much more important role in the
samples of small and young firms than in the
other samples. Regarding the Sargan and second
order serial correlation tests, we find that the
Sargan test is always accepted, with the excep-
tions of column 3 in Table V and column 2 in
Table VI. The second-order serial correlations
test is never rejected. This confirms the consis-
tency of the results.
6. Conclusions and implications
Taking unbalanced panel data on Portuguese
manufacturing (surviving) firms over the period
1990–2001 to estimate a dynamic panel data
model of firm growth that includes serial cor-
relation and financing constraints using the
pooled OLS and GMM-sys techniques, the
purpose of this paper is to analyse whether
liquidity constraints faced by business firms af-
fect firm growth. Our overall results suggest that
the growth of Portuguese manufacturing firms is
finance constrained. However, when we split our
sample by firm size and firm age we find that the
smaller and young firms’ growth is more limited
in terms of the cash flow available, which signals
greater financing constraints for these firms.
Capital constraints are more likely to affect the
growth of smaller and younger firms. The
severity of financial constraints may be related
to financial markets. Portuguese capital markets
are still relatively undeveloped and recourse to
equity is limited to a reduced number of firms.
Thus, companies typically rely almost exclu-
sively on banks for external finance. However,
for smaller and young firms the dependence on
internal earnings is stronger.
It is also important to enhance that the same
finding that smaller and younger firms have
higher growth-cash flow sensitivities than larger
and more mature firms which is interpreted as
consistent with the suggestion that financial
constraints on firm growth may be relatively
more severe for small and young firms may be
interpreted in different way if we consider the
more recent literature. Particularly the second
group of papers which interpret the higher
investment/cash flow sensitivity of younger and
smaller firm in absence of financial market
imperfection as the outcome of these firms
reaction to the fact that realisation of their cash
flows reveals them the direction to go in pres-
ence of uncertainty of their growth prospect.
Since small firms account for a large share of
employment growth and since many small firms
engage in highly innovative activities, one might
argue that small-firm activity generates benefits
that contribute to the long-run growth of the
economy. One might argue for policy recom-
mendations favouring small firms. The policy
makers should strongly consider the implemen-
tation of programs to promote the birth, growth
and innovation activities of small firms. In
addition, policy makers should take measures to
favour development of the financial market:
stimulating market transparency; improving
access to information; to stimulate to support,
and to develop venture capital.
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Notes
1 See, for example, Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard
(1998).
2 See, for example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) on
financing constraints and entrepreneurial choice and Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1994) on liquidity constraints and entrepre-
neurial survival.
3 However, the quantitative size of the departure is typi-
cally small. Scherer and Ross (1990: 144) reach the con-
clusion that recent studies find only a ‘‘weak’’ correlation
between growth rates and size. Studies finding mild depar-
tures of growth rates’ independence from firm size include
Kumar (1985), Hall (1987) and Evans (1987a, 1987b). Acs
and Audretsch (1990: 145) state that, when they incorporate
the impact of firm exits, they find that the greater
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propensity of small firms to exit the industry offsets the
higher growth rate of surviving firms, and this could recon-
cile their results with Evans (1987a, 1987b) and Hall (1987).
4 This approach received strong critiques from Kaplan
and Zingales (1997, 2000). These authors find that cash flow
sensitivities are not informative about potential financial
constraints. Fazzari et al. (2000), in reply to these criticisms,
state that there is a wide range of cases where there is a
relationship between cash flow sensitivities and the relative
financial constraint of the firm.
5 Liquidity constraints, measured by cash flow, have been
shown to negatively affect firm’s investment (Bond et al.,
2003) and to increase the likelihood of failure (Holtz-Eakin
et al., 1994).
6 ai „ 0 would allow for a deterministic trend specific to
each firm, which could exist but which would be very dif-
ficult to identify with few observations per firm. The pos-
sibility of a common deterministic trend is captured,
however, through the time effects dt.
7 With b < 1, in the short run it is possible for the var-
iance of the cross-sectional distribution of 22firm sizes to
either increase or decrease. In the long run, however, this
variance converges and stabilises at its equilibrium value.
8 For a detailed description of the theoretical and
empirical underpinnings of the liquidity-constrained
investment models see, for example, Hoshi et al. (1991),
Elston (1993), Bond and Meghir (1994) or Fazzari et al.
(1988).
9 See, for example, Schiantarelli (1996).
10 This was assessed by comparison with alternative esti-
mators such as OLS levels, which are known to produce
biased estimates of autoregressive parameters.
11 The currency used is euros.
12 The system GMM estimates that we report are com-
puted using DPD for OX (see Doornik et al., 2002).
13 See Arellano and Bond (1991) for further details of
these procedures, which were implemented using OX and
the DPD program.
14 Larger firms can finance their growth from internal re-
sources, debt or issuance of equity.
15 Qualitative data on financing constraints are not avail-
able in our database.
Appendix A
Table A.I
Pooled OLS results for whole sample





































wJS 235.3 [0.000] 381.7 [0.000] 592.1[0.000] 739.4 [0.000]
m1 )0.2609 [0.794] )0.2502 [0.802] )1.336 [0.182] )1.458 [0.145]
m2 )0.8295 [0.407] )1.571 [0.116] )0.592 [0.554] )1.266 [0.205]
Notes: All estimates include a full set of time dummies. The null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero is tested using
robust standard errors. Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity are
reported in parenthesis. WJS is the Wald statistic of joint significance of the independent variables (excluding time dummies
and the constant term). m1 (m2) is a test of the null hypothesis of no first- (second-) order serial correlation. P-values in square
brackets. The underlying sample consists of 7653 firms and a total of 34,482 observations.
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Table A.II
Pooled OLS results for micro and small firms (<50 employees)





































wJS 221.0 [0.000] 346.2 [0.000] 524.4 [0.000] 623.9 [0.000]
m1 )0.3207 [0.748] )0.3518 [0.725] )1.296 [0.195] )1.419 [0.156]
m2 )1.210 [0.226] )1.918 [0.055] )1.043 [0.297] )1.645 [0.100]
Notes: as in Table A.I. The underlying sample consists of 5874 firms and a total of 25,970 observations.
Table A.III
Pooled OLS results for medium and large firms (‡50 employees)




































wJS 8.606 [0.014] 39.34 [0.000] 105.5 [0.000] 153.5 [0.000]
m1 )0.064 [0.949] 0.064 [0.949] )0.596 [0.551] )0.522 [0.602]
m2 2.184 [0.029] 1.833 [0.067] 3.664 [0.000] 3.084 [0.002]
Notes: as in Table A.I. The underlying sample consists of 1779 firms and a total of 8512 observations.
Table A.IV
Pooled OLS results for young firms (£10 years old)





































wJS 135.2 [0.000] 168.8 [0.000] 306.8 [0.000] 331.9 [0.000]
m1 )0.674 [0.500] )0.500 [0.617] )1.010 [0.312] )0.904 [0.366]
m2 )0.731 [0.465] )1.023 [0.306] )0.204 [0.839] )0.431 [0.667]
Notes: as in Table A.I. The underlying sample consists of 3795 firms and a total of 16,525 observations.
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